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Debates about “sustainable development” during the past decade have 
highlighted the intimate interconnection between “environment” and 
“economy”.2 It is now widely agreed that concerns about one cannot be 
divorced from concerns about the other. Environmental policy obviously has 
profound implications for the economy; just as economic policy has 
ramifications for the quality of the environment, and efforts to improve the 
same.3
Given the greater acceptance of these links, analysts have paid more 
attention during the past ten years to the ways in which the two interact. This 
paper aims to contribute to this general debate by looking at one particular 
question: to what extent have concerns about economic competitiveness, and 
the interests of industry more generally, influenced the development of the 
European Union's policy on ozone layer depletion?
By focusing upon this rather specific question, it is anticipated that a 
number of different areas will be opened up for exploration. Most obviously, 
the concerns of the Union's producers and users of ozone-depleting substances 
will be revealed — not only the factors that have affected perception of their 
own interests, but also the ways in which they have tried to exert control over 
policy reform. The question also directs attention to the decision-makers — that 
is, it invites us to investigate how decision-makers have reacted to these 
pressures.
The paper is divided into five subsequent sections. Section two presents a 
brief overview of the issue of ozone layer depletion. It focuses, in particular, 
upon the EC/EU response, while nevertheless placing it within the broader 
global context. The next three sections analyse a number of individual debates, 
broadly following a chronological order. More specifically, they focus upon the 
regulation of chiorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons and a few more 
recent concerns, which include the regulation of methyl bromide. The paper 
concludes with a summary, as well as some tentative answers to the questions 
initially posed.
2 The author thanks Andrew Jordan (CSERGE) and the participants at the workshop in 
Florence for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
3 For further information about the relationship between ‘environment’ and ‘economy’, see 
WCED (1987) — the publication that did more than any other to popularise the notion of 




























































































During the past quarter of a century, the issue of ozone layer depletion has 
attracted considerable scientific and political attention. Though not without its 
ups and downs, the international community has steadily strived to reach 
progressively more-restrictive agreements on the production and use of the 
chemicals that serve to deplete the planet's protective layer of stratospheric 
ozone. A full examination of the issue's development is, of course, beyond the 
scope of this contribution (Morrisette 1989, Parson 1993, Rowlands 1995a, 
Parson and Greene 1995). What is useful for the purposes of this particular 
study, however, is a review of the key decisions emerging from both global and 
European fora.
Table 2.1 lists the most significant global agreements. Of particular note 
in this list is the landmark 1987 Montreal Protocol, along with its subsequent 
amendments. Table 2.2, meanwhile, lists the outputs arising from European 
discussions. Since 1988, they have mainly taken the form of Regulations, as 
European decision-makers have decided how the global agreements should be 
implemented, and possibly built upon.4
As the purpose of this section is to lay the backdrop for the rest of the 
paper, it is also useful to remind ourselves of the “balance of power” between 
the Commission and the Member States throughout the history of the ozone 
layer depletion issue. This is crucial to ensure a full understanding of the 
development of the European response.
4 Environmental outcomes at the EC level have usually taken the form of 'Directives', which, 
though binding on all Members States with respect to the result to be achieved, nevertheless 
leave responsibility with regard to the form and means to be used to achieve the stated 
objectives up to the Member States. Alternatively, the legal form for implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol and its amendments has been the ‘Regulation’. Regulations have direct 
application in the Member States and come into force immediately. Jachtenfuchs argues that 
this was done “in order to avoid trade distortions resulting from non-simultaneous application 





























































































Table 2.1 Major International Agreements
International
Agreement
Key Dates and Status Major Commitments |
Vienna
Convention on 
Depletion of the 
Ozone Layer
opened for signature: 22 March 1985 
entered into force: September 1988 








opened for signature: 16 September 
1987
entered into force: January 1989 
current status: 155 ratifications (at 31 
March 1996)
— freezing of consumption of 
five CFCs by 1992 and 50 per 
cent reduction by 1999.
— freezing of consumption of 






agreed: 29 June 1990 
amendments entered into force: 
August 1992
current status: 106 ratifications (at 31 
March 1996)
— elimination of 15 CFCs, 
three halons and carbon 
tetrachloride by 2000.







agreed: 25 November 1992 
amendments entered into force: June 
1994
current status: 57 ratifications (at 31 
March 1996)
— elimination of 15 CFCs, 
carbon tetrachloride, methyl 
chloroform and HBCs by 1996.
— elimination of three halons 
by 1994.
~  freeze of HCFCs by 1996, 
with their eventual elimination 
by 2030.
— freeze of methyl bromide by 
1995.
1 Vienna
j Adjustments to 
I the Montreal 
I Protocol
agreed: 7 December 1995 — lower cap on HCFCs, but 
elimination date remains at 
2030.
elimination of methyl 
bromide by 2010, with 25 per 
cent cut by 2001 and 50 per 
cent cut by 2005.
Sources: The Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol, the London Adjustments and 
Amendments, and the Copenhagen Adjustments and Amendments are reprinted in 
International Legal Materials. Respectively, each appears in: Vol. 26 (1989), pp. 1516-40; 
Vol. 26 (1989), pp. 1541-61; Vol. 30 (1991), pp. 537-54; and Vol. 32 (1993), pp. 874-87. The 




























































































Table 2.2 Major European Agreements
European Agreement Date Agreed Major Commitments
Resolution (C I33) 30 May 1978 
(OJ C133, 7 June 
1978)
— calls for industry not to increase 
production capacity of two CFCs.
Decision 80/372 26 March 1980 
(OJ L90, 3 Aprii 
1980)
— calls on all Member States to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that there is 
no increase in production capacity of two 
CFCs.
— Members States are to achieve a 30 per 
cent reduction in the use of CFCs in aerosol 
cans by 1982.
Decision 82/795 16 November 
1982
(OJ L329, 25 
November 1982)
— repeats obligation of Decision 80/372
-  adds a definition of production capacity 
and a reference figure for annual Community 
CFC production capacity (480 000 tonnes).
Decision 88/540 and 
Regulation 3322/88
14 October 1988 
(OJ L297, 31 
October 1988)
-- enables the Community to ratify the 
Vienna Convention and the Montreal 
Protocol.
-  implements the terms of the Montreal 
Protocol.
Regulation 594/91 4 March 1991 (OJ 
L67, 14 March 
1991)
-- elimination of CFCs advanced by mid- 
1997, carbon tetrachloride by 1998, halons 
by 2000 and methyl chloroform by 2006.




— elimination of halons by 1994, CFCs and 
carbon tetrachloride by 1995 and methyl 
chloroform by 1996.
Regulation 3093/94 15 December 
1994 (OJ L333, 
22 December 
1994)
— freezing of methyl bromide production by 
1995, and 25 per cent reduction by 1998.
— elimination of HCFC consumption by 
2015, with five intermediate targets (cap set 
at 2.6 per cent of CFC consumption and 
HCFC consumption in 1989).




























































































When international debate about the ozone layer began — during the mid- 
1970s — “it was not clear that the EC was competent to negotiate in these 
matters” (Jachtenfuchs 1990:262). This, however, did not prevent the 
Commission from participating in the ongoing international negotiations, and, 
indeed, signing the Vienna Convention when it was opened for signature in 
March 1985.5 Of most significance, however, was a decision taken at a meeting 
of the EC Environment Council on 24 November 1986. At that time, the 
Member States authorised the Commission to take part, on behalf of the 
Community, in the negotiations towards a protocol. The Commission was, 
however, presented with a well-defined mandate (Jachtenfuchs 1990:265) — a 
mandate which, under the terms of the Treaty of Rome, had to be agreed 
unanimously by the Council.
This has continued to be the general trend since that time — that is, the 
Council of Ministers has debated a particular position, which, when agreed, has 
been presented to the Commission. The Commission has, in turn, negotiated on 
behalf of the Community in the international meetings. When agreements have 
been reached at this level — at so-called “Meetings of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol” — the issue has returned to the Council of Ministers. The 
Member States' environment ministers have had to decide how the 
commitments agreed at the international forum should be translated into EC and 
Member State law (and whether the Community should go beyond the terms of 
the just-reached international commitment). A development worthy of note, 
however, is that the Single European Act of 1987 introduced the possibility of 
Qualified Majority Voting; this has in fact been used in the development of 
policy on ozone layer depletion. Moreover, the Treaty on European Union of 
1992 provided for even further input — stronger powers of veto and amendment 
-  by the European Parliament (Chance 1995); though to a limited extent, 
Parliament has nevertheless also been involved in the ozone layer depletion 
issue.
Controlling CFCs
Discussions About a Potential “Can Ban", 1974-1985
When significant concern about potential ozone layer depletion first arose, 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were the set of chemicals initially deemed most
5 The issue of external competence and the Commission’s ability to negotiate on behalf of 
the Member states also plays a crucial role in the cases of pesticides (Working Paper RSC 





























































































culpable.6 The United States was the first country to react. In 1977, a “can ban” 
was instituted there — that is, a restriction upon the use of CFCs as propellants 
in non-essential aerosol sprays. Soon afterwards, US representatives began to 
push for a similar global ban.7 With this, we see the first connection between 
the European Community's external policy on the ozone layer and its concern 
for competitiveness at a variety of levels. (Table 2.3 reveals that Community 
production of CFCs in 1974 accounted for one-third of the world total, though 
somewhat less than that of the United States.)
The Community response at this time was cautious, to say the least. As 
outlined in Table 2.2, Community agreements fell short of the desired can ban; 
indeed, the production cap adopted in 1980 had little impact (because European 
industry was operating well below capacity at this time), and the 30 per cent 
reduction in the use of CFCs in aerosol cans was easily achievable because use 
figures were already declining (in response to changes that had already 
occurred). In fact, Haigh suggests that “there is reason to believe that the figure 
of 30 per cent was chosen because it was known that it could be achieved 
without creating too much difficulty for industry” (Haigh 1989:268).
Table 2.3





USSR and Eastern Europe 8
Other OECD 5
Developing Countries 2
Note: All calculations by weight.
Sources: Compiled from Gamlen et al (1986); OECD (1976) and Thornton (1990).
6 Some of the discussion in this section is taken from Rowlands (1995, Chapter 5).




























































































Can EC prudence during the late 1970s really be explained by concerns 
for industrial competitiveness? Two immediate reasons — suggesting that any 
can ban in the EC would have been much more economically damaging than it 
had been in the USA — suggest that it can. First, more CFC production went to 
the aerosol spray industry in the EC as compared to the USA — in both relative 
and absolute terms.8 As a consequence, an EC ban upon the use of CFCs in 
non-essential aerosols would affect a greater proportion of its industry, and 
could thereby be more economically disruptive in Europe than it had been in the 
United States.
And second, the international trade in CFCs was very lucrative for a 
number of European states during the 1970s. Indeed, compared with the US, EC 
countries exported a higher share of their CFC production. The value of British 
exports, for example, was placed at [UK]£70 million in 1974 (DoE 1976:6). 
Thus, if the EC states were to restrict production, then substantial export 
markets might have to be forsaken. Explicitly citing this as a rationale for its 
own laissez-faire policy on CFCs, the UK Minister of State for the 
Environment, Denis Howell, said in 1975 that an aerosol ban could cause “a 
considerable loss to our balance of payments” and have ‘Tar-reaching 
repercussions on the aerosol industry” (NS 1975:336).
More generally, reports from both national governments and the 
Commission itself highlighted the detrimental economic impact that further 
regulation could have. As an example of the former, the British Department of 
the Environment estimated that 50,000 jobs were “related, either directly or 
indirectly, to some aspect of CFC manufacture or usage” (DoE 1976:6). In a 
1980 communication (COM(80)339 16.6.80), meanwhile, the Commission 
stated that any further reduction in CFC use in aerosol sprays (beyond the 30 
per cent figure) would “be likely to cause socio-economic problems because of 
existing overcapacity in the industry” (Haigh 1989:267).
References to the United Kingdom in the above paragraphs suggest that 
this country had a particular interest in the development of the debate. And so it 
did. At the end of the 1970s, the UK was reported to be the largest producer of 
aerosol units in the Community (Haigh 1989:267), and British entities worked 
to defend these interests. In 1978, for example, a report published by the British
8 In 1973, approximately three-quarters of all CFCs used in the EC went into aerosol sprays, 
while in the US, the figure was just under one-half. This also meant that, even in spite of the 
greater consumption of CFCs in the United States, there were still more aerosol units, in 
absolute terms, filled with CFCs in the Community as compared with the United States. (Data 




























































































Aerosol Manufacturers Association noted that there was much scientific 
confusion, and therefore “there is no hazard in waiting for more definite 
scientific conclusions, nor any reason to restrict manufacturers’ choice of 
propellants for aerosol cans” (NS 1978:830). The British government often 
echoed such views.9
Thus, there is some strong evidence to suggest that there was a 
correlation between concerns for competitiveness and external policy on this 
particular environmental issue during the late 1970s. Indeed, Richard Benedick 
— who served as the lead negotiator for the United States during much of the 
negotiations — is thus convinced. He argues that during the 1970s, the EC 
Commission:
was sympathetic to industry arguments that strong controls on aerosols would 
impose hardships because of the substantial existing overcapacity and the 
allegedly large capital investment required to convert to the hydrocarbon
propellants used by companies in the United States......In addition, all the EC
‘regulations’ were actually implemented by voluntary agreements with the 
manufacturers. In sum, these were painless moves, fully supported by 
European industry, that gave an appearance of control while in reality 
permitting continued expansion (Benedick 1991:25).
With a change of administration in the United States, coupled with less 
urgent scientific reports, the ozone layer debate fell down the international 
agenda during the first half of the 1980s (Rowlands 1995a). Notwithstanding 
the opening for signature of a framework convention in March 1985 (see Table 
2.1), less pressure existed for further regulation. This attitude, however, 
changed dramatically with the announcement of the discovery of an “ozone 
crater” over Antarctica in May 1985, and more urgent scientific findings.
Protocol Negotiations, 1986-1987
With this dramatic, and unexpected, finding, the international negotiations were 
given a greater sense of urgency. Informal discussions about an international 
protocol took place throughout 1986; the following year, formal negotiations 
began. (Note, in Table 2.4, that by 1986, EC production of CFCs had clearly
9 In April 1976, UK Environment Minister Denis Howell remarked:
To put this matter [potential ozone layer depletion] in perspective, this [any projected increase 
in ultraviolet radiation reaching ground level] would be equivalent to the increase in exposure 
incurred by a person moving from Northern England to the South Coast of England. (HC 909 




























































































surpassed that of the United States, making the Community the largest single 
producer in the world.)
The US led the calls for strong controls, continuing to argue the case for a 
immediate prohibition on CFCs as aerosol propellants. In light of this particular 
emphasis, the European reaction continued to be cautious. For his part. 
Benedick argues that:
Some European industrialists had suspected all along that the United States 
was using the ozone scare to cloak commercial motivations. They now 
believed that American companies had endorsed CFC controls in order to enter 
the profitable EC export markets with substitute products that they had secretly 
developed (Benedick 1991:123).'®
Although this position might be a bit extreme," concerns about the impact of 
the international negotiations upon the economy were invariably affecting the 
EC negotiators’ perspective. However, they recognised that if they were not at 
least seen to be receptive to the Americans’ efforts to forge an international 
agreement, then the United States could well follow up their fresh threat to take 
unilateral action and impose trade sanctions (Haas 1993:165). For this and other 
reasons, some action was considered.
Table 2.4 _____ Global CFC Production by Countrv/Region, 1986




USSR and Eastern Europe 11
Developing Countries 4
Other OECD 3
Note: All calculations by weight.
Sources: Compiled from UNEP (1993), Gamlen (1986), Thornton (1990). *
'0  Benedick goes on to note that: "... this suspicion was unfounded: to the dismay of 
environmentalists, du Pont had admitted in 1986 that it had ceased research on 
chlorofluorocarbon alternatives in 1981” (p. 123).
' '  For the argument that Benedick misunderstood and therefore misrepresented key elements 




























































































For the purposes of this paper, it is appropriate to focus not only upon the 
extent of reductions in CFCs being advocated by different groups in the 
negotiations during the first half of 1987, but also upon the kinds of reductions. 
The latter highlights some differences of opinion. On the one hand, the United 
States (and its allies, often collectively referred to as the ‘Toronto Group’12) 
continued to push for a control upon particular end uses (specifically, the can 
ban). The EC, on the other hand, wanted attention directed to all CFCs, arguing 
that a molecule of CFC had the same impact upon the ozone layer, irrespective 
of its source. Their representatives also argued that production — rather than 
consumption -- should be the figures that were controlled, for this would be 
easier to monitor. These preferences can be explained at least in part by the 
impact that specific end use controls upon consumption would have upon EC 
competitiveness.
Because of the already existing ban on CFCs as aerosol propellants in the 
United States (and some other countries), alternatives (both substitute chemicals 
and new technologies) had been developed by American industry. 
Consequently, if a can ban were at that time to be implemented world-wide, 
then American companies would have potentially-lucrative export markets 
opened up by a global ban. Moreover, even if there were regulations placed 
upon all CFCs (that is, not distinguishing between end-uses), the US would still 
have an interest in advancing a ‘consumption’ basis. If this were the case, then 
CFC exports would effectively escape regulation (for consumption would 
presumably be calculated by production minus exports plus imports). Faced 
with no restraints upon future international activity, the large US producers of 
CFCs could be tempted to compete against European producers around the 
world.
Alternatively, however, if the regulations limited production, then the 
dominance of the EC in global export markets would be preserved (for any 
other country could only increase export sales at the expense of domestic 
consumption). And, at a much more basic level, restrictions that did not focus 
upon end-uses would also favour the EC: they could make the initial reductions 
in areas of their choice. Alternatively, a global can ban would not only serve to 
cut off valuable export markets, but could also force EC countries to import 
alternative chemicals and replacement technologies. Obviously, this would be a 
double-blow to the Member States’ trade balances.
Not surprisingly then, the EC, even when it accepted the notion that cuts 
were possible, was still only willing to consider such moves for CFC production




























































































as a whole — ostensibly for two major reasons. First, because it would be easy to 
administer (because of the relatively small number of CFC producers), and 
second, because any ban on particular end uses would only be a temporary 
remedy (for increases in other uses would inevitably continue). Nevertheless, it 
is clear that concerns about competitiveness inevitably were also a part of the 
calculation made by EC representatives.'3
In the end — that is, at the conference in Montreal in September 1987 
where a protocol was eventually agreed — a compromise was reached: both 
production and consumption were controlled, with the former permitted to be 
slightly higher than the latter. (This was designed to create excess supply in 
Northern countries, which would thus allow a limited expansion in exports in 
order to meet the ‘basic domestic needs’ of developing countries.) Given this — 
along with the lack of differentiation among end-uses in the Protocol — it is 
clear that the 1987 Treaty reflects EC economic interests, at least to some 
extent.
The view that the Community's actions during the Protocol negotiations 
can be explained, at least to a significant degree, by concerns for 
competitiveness and industrial interests more generally, is one that is held by 
many commentators. Karen Litfin, for one, argues that during 1986, the “EC's 
position was strongly influenced by industry; in fact, industry representatives 
sat on the delegations of some EC countries” (Litfin 1994:107). Benedick also 
maintains that the EC view “followed the industry line and reflected the views 
of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom” (Benedick 1991:68). Oye and 
Maxwell argue that both “the US and the EC wished to prevent the other's 
industry from gaining a competitive advantage through the content of an 
international agreement that limited the usage of CFCs” (Oye and Maxwell 
1995:199). And perhaps the most telling indictment is a quotation from the 
individual who was shepherding the international negotiations at this time, 
UNEP Executive-Director Mostafa Tolba, who reportedly said that the 
“difficulties in negotiating the Montreal Protocol had nothing to do with 
whether the environment was damaged or not. It was all about who was going 
to gain an edge over whom; whether Du Pont would have an advantage over the 
European companies or not” (MacKenzie 1988:25).
' 3 Additionally, the EC insisted upon being treated as a single unit for the purposes of 
consumption. Its representatives argued that, because this figure included imports and exports, 
restrictions upon the consumption levels of individual Member States would pose a barrier to 
trade within the Community and thus contrary to the Treaty of Rome and efforts to create a 




























































































Notwithstanding these observations, however, it is clear that the entire 
process can not be wholly explained by concerns for competitiveness and 
industrial interests more generally. Pressure for regulatory reform derives from 
advances in scientific knowledge, competing goals of global environmental 
protection, and the dynamics inherent to the bargaining process itself. Indeed, 
simply note that the Montreal Protocol was actually agreed, and that it imposed 
significant obligations upon its Parties: before conclusive scientific evidence 
was available, countries had agreed to halve their production and consumption 
of a range of “vital” industrial chemicals. Moreover, Edward Parson argues that 
concerns for competitiveness found less voice as the negotiations continued: 
“Several observers contend that it was sometime between September 1986 and 
April 1987 that European industry lost control of national delegations” (Parson 
1993:42).
Finally, telling the story as we have done here suggests a certain 
uniformity of purpose and interests on the part of the EC and its Member States 
during the negotiations towards a Protocol. This was certainly not the case, for 
it is certainly important to highlight the differences within the Community — 
that is, the way in which different perceptions of economic impacts did or did 
not play a role in the policies of various Member States. In such a discussion on 
the Protocol negotiations, attention is usually initially directed to the United 
Kingdom and France.
Table 2.5________ CFC Production in EC Member States. 1986
Country Tonnes of 
CFC produced
Country Tonnes of 
CFC produced
Belgium 0 Italy 60,000*
Denmark 0 Luxembourg 0
France 73.157 Netherlands 45,859
Germany 125,579 Portugal 0

































































































Table 2.5 reveals that the United Kingdom was Europe’s second-largest 
producer of CFCs in the mid-1980s.14 Within this, meanwhile, Imperial 
Chemical Industries (ICI) was the major British producer.15 The chemical 
industry in general, and ICI in particular, has traditionally had a special position 
in the eyes of successive British governments.16 As a consequence, many argue, 
ICI exercised a considerable influence upon UK decision-making, pushing for a 
sceptical “go slow” approach. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, for 
example, while some were pushing for a wider negotiation mandate for the 
Commission, the British (often with the French) ensured that the Council, which 
had to decide unanimously, was not granted it (Jachtenfuchs 1990:265). For his 
part, Benedick argues that ICI not only influenced British policy, but was also 
“the driving force in the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers’ 
Federations, which was an active lobbyist in Brussels and a conspicuous 
presence during the negotiations” (Benedick 1991:39). Indeed, the movement 
that was eventually seen in the EC's negotiating position (particularly during the 
summer of 1987) stemmed significantly from a relaxation of the British attitude. 
This, in turn, many argue, came about as a result of a change in attitude on the 
part of ICI (Jachtenfuchs 1990:268, Maxwell and Weiner 1993).17 Thus, the 
concern for economic competitiveness and industry was prevalent in the British 
position.
A similar story can be written about the influence of Atochem upon 
France, the Community's third-largest CFC producer in 1986. The interests of 
the French government in Atochem extended beyond simple concern about the 
health of the nation's economy as a whole: it is part of the state chemicals giant 
Elf Aquitaine. As a result, the French government — and occasionally individual
14 Any suggestion as to production levels of chemicals must be taken cautiously! Owing to 
concerns about inter-industry secrecy, companies are loath to publish explicit figures about 
production levels (or the value of the same) of chemicals. Consequently, such figures are often 
estimates or even ‘best guesses’.
15 “By the late 1980s, ICI accounted for more than 80 percent of total British CFC output...” 
(Maxwell and Weiner 1993:33).
16 See, for example. Grant et al 1989:78. Moreover. Maxwell and Weiner argue that "... the 
British departments were unapologetic about the closeness of government-industry 
collaboration” (Maxwell and Weiner 1993:30).
17 ICI were also concerned that “[c)onsumer-driven environmental concerns, which were 
widespread in 1987, were not limited to CFC products, and could potentially diminish the 




























































































Commissioners18 — worked to protect their interests. It was only after the 
British volte-face, when the French found themselves virtually isolated in their 
belief that controls could be slower, that a relaxation of policy was 
considered.19
Turning to the largest producer of CFCs in the Community, one might 
similarly expect industry to influence the position of government and to 
advocate a “go slow” approach. This, however, was not the case. West Germany 
was more pro-active in the negotiations than the other major Community 
producers. Indeed, Benedick credits West Germany with being “at the 
forefront” in the drive for tighter controls on CFCs (Benedick 1991:113).20 In 
1986, for example, the country registered a formal protest when a Council 
Decision was, in its eyes, too conservative (Benedick 1991:69). Additionally, 
during the negotiations for the Montreal Protocol, the German representatives 
pushed for an aerosol ban and a 50 per cent overall reduction (Benedick 
1991:84). They also co-sponsored reports (for example the 1986 WMO/NASA 
Assessment) and held a number of major scientific meetings on the issue (Litfin 
1994:110).
The West German calls for regulatory reform on ozone layer depletion 
can largely be explained by domestic public pressures. Indeed any belief, on the 
part of that country's decision-makers, that the demand for controls on CFCs 
could be resisted were discarded after the 1986 elections — a time at which the 
Green Party made an impressive showing. Because of this tide, officials in both 
the West German government and the country’s chemical industry had a desire 
for Europe to take the lead on the issue, for a variety of reasons. The 
businessperson, for one, wanted “a common set of conditions for marketing 
[his/her] products in order to avoid costly duplication of tests” (Grant, Paterson 
and Whitson 1988:289). Second, regulation at the European level would more 
likely be weaker than it would otherwise be if made only in West Germany. As 
Grant and colleagues argue, West German industrialists recognised that, at the 
European level,
the "Greens" are weaker, and other countervailing forces can be mobilised. At
the very least, it can be ensured that the "misery is shared" so that the German
18 Benedick — developing his general thesis that the European view was informed by a need 
to protect industry — reports that a paper distributed by the French government, with ‘EC 
views’ contained therein, was published on Atochem letterhead (Benedick 1991:78).
19 The Spanish and Italians have also been identified as ‘draggers’ by some.
211 He also notes that West Germany “was instrumental in turning around the European 




























































































chemical industry is not disadvantaged by more stringent environmental
regulation than applies elsewhere in Europe (Grant et al 1989:78).
And third. West German support for EC solutions is also fuelled by “a high 
degree of compatibility between their political/administrative assumptions and 
community procedures” (Grant et al 1988:290). Thus, West German willingness 
to adopt a strong European position might still be explained, at least in part, by 
concerns about economic competitiveness and the health of industry more 
generally.
Nevertheless, the caution that was called for when examining the 
Community as a whole should also be exercised here. There were costs upon all 
EC countries. Even in those that were not producers of CFCs, there were 
entities -- for example, aerosol propellant producers, dry-cleaners, refrigeration, 
etc — that were reliant upon the use of CFCs in the goods that they produced 
and sold. Conceivably, therefore, all member states could be adversely affected 
by any restriction upon the production and consumption of CFCs. In spite of 
this, a number of countries were extremely forward-looking. Denmark, for one, 
pushed for a strong consumption formula during the protocol negotiations 
(Benedick 1991:80). The Dutch and the Belgians were two other countries often 
identified as part of this more “pro-active” grouping (Benedick 1991). The 
negotiating positions of these states highlights again the occasional dominance 
of competing sources of pressure for regulatory reform.
Accelerated Phaseout, 1987-1995
Following the Protocol negotiations, implementation in the Community was the 
first task. Under the West German Presidency during the first half of 1988, that 
government's representatives tried to push the Community to go beyond the 
terms of the Protocol (and thus implement even tighter controls upon ozone- 
depleting chemicals, as the West Germans had done unilaterally). Though these 
efforts helped ensure the Council agreed to ratify both the Vienna Convention 
and the Montreal Protocol in June 1988, Jachtenfuchs argues that the wishes of 
DGIII (internal market) were able to reign supreme (over not only the 
preferences of the West Germans, but also DGXI (environment)), and the 
Protocol was implemented virtually “word-for-word” in EC regulation (See 
Table 2.2).
Nevertheless, by the end of 1988, a further change of attitude took place 
among the traditionally-sceptical in the Community. With the “greening” of 




























































































British position. The final thrust for this came from not only the impact of 
British scientific reports,21 but also the agreement from IC1 for a total phaseout.
Though the final shift in the ICI position is publicly-attributed to an 
industry review of the Ozone Trends Panel's report from March 1988 (Parson 
1993:46), Maxwell and Weiner place emphasis upon commercial 
considerations. They note that in 1988 it was expected that CFCs would largely 
be replaced by other chemicals. As a result, opportunity for first-mover 
advantages arose—”[p]roducts and market share would accrue to the companies 
that developed process technology for making substitutes in the most cost 
effective and rapid manner possible” (Oye and Maxwell 1995:200). The fact 
that the substitute chemicals might be five times as costly as CFCs lent further 
impetus (Maxwell and Weiner 1993:33-34). Finally, Litfin highlights the 
attraction for ICI of potential international markets — that is, if global controls 
were implemented, then global markets for substitutes could well be 
forthcoming. Ironically, “ICI paid the travel expenses for some delegates from 
developing countries to attend [the March 1989 conference in London on 
‘Saving the Ozone Layer’” (Litfin 1994:211-212, fn8). The French change of 
opinion, meanwhile, was further prompted by increased isolation, and desires 
on the part of President Francois Mitterand to do nothing to blemish his 
environmental credentials.22 The interests of Atochem in the potential substitute 
chemicals (see below) no doubt also played a role.
So by the end of the decade, it was clear that the days of CFC use in the 
industrialised world were numbered.23 While this is not meant to suggest that 
the challenge posed by CFCs had necessarily been met — developing country
21 The UK's Stratospheric Ozone Review Group released its report in the summer of 1988. In 
this, they agreed that the controls in the Montreal Protocol would not be sufficient to prevent 
further significant destruction of the ozone layer. (UKSORG 1988).
22 The French change of heart (which was fully apparent by March 1989) was explained thus:
“... France, maintaining that unilateral reductions would not save the ozone layer and would 
only benefit non-European companies, had found itself isolated in its opposition to stringent 
reductions. But France relented, apparently favouring its political interests over its economic 
interests. President Mitterand, taking a leadership role in efforts to prevent global climate 
change, was cosponsoring an international conference on the global environment in The 
Hague later that month. Had his government blocked efforts in the EC to save the ozone layer, 
Mitterand would have been in an embarrassing position at that conference” (Litfin 1994:128- 
9).
23 Many CFC users, for their part, were not resisting further controls, for they eventually 





























































































use, illegal trade and implementation more generally are still three outstanding 
tests — it is meant to imply that the most contentious debates about CFC 
production and use in the European Union had, by the end of the 1980s, been 
resolved.
Controlling HCFCs
With the elimination of CFCs gaining widespread support among the OECD 
countries during the late 1980s, greater political attention could be paid to the 
other potential ozone-depleters. Top of this list were hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs). HCFCs were identified as potential substitutes for up to 30 per cent 
of the controlled CFCs.24 Although more ozone-benign than CFCs, they were 
by no means “wonder chemicals”, for they still destroyed some stratospheric 
ozone. In light of this fact, pressure mounted during the first half of 1990 to 
impose restrictions upon their use at the Second Meeting of the Parties in 
London in June of that year.
A number of industry officials resisted this pressure. They maintained 
that society's primary goal must be to eliminate CFCs as quickly as possible. 
Although there were problems associated with the use of HCFCs, they were 
perceived to be the most attractive alternative, at least during this “transition 
phase”. Thus, the argument continued, it was better to use the lesser of two evils 
while more appropriate alternatives were being developed and tested — in this 
instance, therefore, the ends justified the means. This view generally prevailed 
during the June meeting, and no restrictions were placed upon the chemicals. 
Instead, signatory nations called for “producers to use [HCFCs] responsibly, 
and work towards eliminating them by 2040” (Schoon 1990:1).
Identifying this as the industry view, however, hides some interesting 
variations among companies' respective interests in HCFCs (see Table 2.6). 
Karen Litfin, for one, reports that the German CFC industry “was silent on the 
issue of HCFCs, having chosen not to invest in chemicals that would only be 
transitional and to rely instead on ozone-safe HFCs [hydrofluorocarbons]” 
(Litfin 1994:150). In the United Kingdom, ICI had taken a similar strategic 
decision — deciding not to invest heavily in HCFCs, but instead also to go on to 
HFCs (Maxwell and Weiner 1993:34-35). As a consequence, both entities had 
interests in regulatory reform which placed controls on HCFCs — or at least for 
clear signals to be sent that HCFC regulation of some kind was inevitable — for
24 This was the estimate at the time. It has since been revised, for hydrocarbons have taken 




























































































this would encourage users to leapfrog the use of HCFCs and proceed straight 
to HFCs.
Table 2.6 Estimated HCFC Production. 1986-1995
Country Tonnes of HCFC 
production
Country Tonnes of HCFC 
production
Belgium 0 Italy 68,400
Denmark 0 Luxembourg 0
France 335,000 Netherlands 95,000
Germany 95,000 Portugal 0
Greece 20,000 Spain 75.000
Ireland 0 United Kingdom 155,000
Source: Greenpeace (1995).
By contrast, the French company Atochem had taken a strategic decision 
to invest heavily in HCFCs. Between 1986 and 1995, the French were 
responsible for 40 per cent of EC production, more than twice as much as the 
second-placed British. Indeed, one report suggested that Atochem was, in 1992, 
the largest single producer of HCFCs in the world (ENDS 1992a: 14).25 One 
might therefore expect the French to be more resistant to controls upon HCFCs. 
This indeed has been the case. As a consequence, the Commission was 
prevented from taking a pro-active line on HCFCs during the negotiations at the 
Fourth Meeting of the Parties in Copenhagen. While most of the Member States 
wanted the CFC element of the HCFC cap to be set at somewhere between 2 
and 2.5 per cent, the French still wanted it to be pegged at 4.0 per cent (ENDS 
1992a: 14).26 French resistance was buttressed by both the United States and the 
developing world.
2-<i A Greenpeace report suggests the same for the period 1986-1995 (when taking ozone- 
depleting potentials of different HCFCs into account) (Greenpeace 1995).
26 At Copenhagen, the French also broke ranks by pushing for the intermediate target (that is, 





























































































The position of the US delegation was informed by the fact that HCFCs 
are used in the large air conditioners that cool office buildings. The country that 
makes the most use of these large chillers is the United States. Because these air 
conditioners have economic lifetimes of up to 40 years, businesspeople wanted 
to ensure that they would be able to keep these chillers operational throughout 
this period. The 0.5 per cent usage allowed between 2020 and 2030, which the 
US delegation demanded and received, guaranteed these machines' continued 
utility.
Developing country representatives, meanwhile, were concerned that a 
quick contraction of the OECD market for HCFCs would have knock-on effects 
for their own development prospects — that is, this possible substitute would not 
be available as an option. Wanting no possibilities to be prematurely, and 
unfairly, foreclosed, they also pushed for laxer controls. Given this, the majority 
of the EU countries could do little to prevent the cap from being set higher than 
they would have liked — namely, 3.1 per cent (Rowlands 1993).
When EC Environment Ministers met the following month (December
1992) in order to consider how the changes agreed at Copenhagen might be 
implemented (and whether or not the Community should go beyond the global 
goals), this debate continued. While same Member States — particularly 
Germany and Denmark — pushed for an accelerated timetable (phaseout by 
2000-2005) and a lower cap, the French continued to lead the resistance to this. 
During the beginning of 1993, this debate continued behind the scenes, with the 
French continuing to press for nothing more than the terms of the Copenhagen 
agreement (EB 1993:4). Indeed, though DGX1 had a proposal ready for the 
Environment Council which went beyond the terms of the Copenhagen 
agreement, this effort was apparently blocked in March by Commission 
President Jacques Delors, who was reportedly following objections raised by 
the French company Atochem (ENDS 1993a:37).27
Three months later (in June), a proposal was finally tabled at a meeting of 
the Council. In this, the magic figure for the cap was set at 2.5 per cent (as 
compared with the 3.1 per cent agreed at Copenhagen), and the complete 
phaseout date proposed as 2014 (as compared with 2030) (ENDS 1993a:37). 
The respective groups of supporters and opponents that formed in response did
27 A spokeswoman for Atochem called such charges of interference ‘idiotic stories’. 
However, a Commission source, speaking on the condition of anonymity, claimed: “You can 
quite rightly blame France. ... They're going to attack [the Commission's proposals] so that 
Atochem will be able to get the greatest possible (HCFC) consumption in the EC” (Love
1993) . It was reported later that the industry and agriculture directorate generals, DG III and 




























































































produce one surprise. As expected, Denmark and Germany continued to push 
for more — each citing its own domestic plans for going well beyond the terms 
of either the Copenhagen amendment or even the draft proposal. Equally as 
expected, the French delegation said that it was opposed to any new controls 
upon HCFCs. What was surprising, however, was that the Italians “not only 
agree[d] to the tighter HCFC controls proposed in the regulation but also 
hint[ed] at possibly going further” (ENDS 1993a:38).
Explaining this movement, participants suggest that although some of the 
Southern countries were instinctively opposed to further controls on HCFCs, 
they feared how their opposition might be used against them in the methyl 
bromide debate. More specifically, given the demand on the part of the United 
States for strong controls on methyl bromide (for reasons outlined in the next 
section of this paper), the Southern Europeans believed that they needed a 
stronger position on HCFCs (the issue on which the US was the dragger) in 
order to ensure that their methyl bromide position remained tenable. In other 
words, they were willing to “budge” on HCFCs to justify a “stick” on methyl 
bromide.
After another couple of months, EC Environment Ministers finally agreed 
something close to this proposed regulation: a 2.6 per cent cap and a 2015 
phaseout date (AE 1993a). Reports suggest that this was only decided after 
qualified majority voting, with the best guess being that the French and the 
Spanish (who had an Atochem-owned HCFC plant on their territory) together 
constituted the defeated opposition (ENDS 1993b:35).
The European Parliament, however, was not satisfied with this, and 
proposed its own set of amendments. They wanted the cap to be lowered to 2 
per cent and HCFC consumption to be eliminated by the year 2002. The 
Parliamentarians also proposed that controls be placed upon production as well 
as consumption (with attendant implications for HCFC exports) (ENDS 
1994a:36). These amendments, however, were rejected by the Ministers when 
they reconvened in June 1994 (ENDS 1994b:36). The Regulation received 
second reading from the Parliament in the late autumn of 1994 and entered into 
force on 23 December 1994.
With the tenth anniversary of the Vienna Convention approaching, 
attention turned to the possibility of regulatory reform which tightened global 
controls on HCFCs yet again. The EC Environment Commission Ritt 
Bjerregaard called for, in September 1995, greater action in a range of areas, 
HCFCs included. A number of countries — Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 




























































































Commission itself — picked this up and pushed for a strong negotiating position 
at a Council Meeting held on 6 October 1995. Others — France, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain — felt less of a sense of urgency. Nevertheless, the former 
were successful, securing a relatively forward-looking negotiating position for 
the Commission to take to the Vienna Conference of the Parties two months 
later. This position called for the cap to be brought down to 2 per cent, leaving 
the phaseout date at the already-agreed date of 2015 (EE 1995:11). Again, the 
fact that the Union was making little progress on the methyl bromide issue helps 
to explain this relatively pro-active stance.
In Vienna in December, the international community reached a 
compromise on HCFCs. While the reduction and elimination timetable 
remained the same (primarily at the continued insistence of the United States), a 
lower baseline figure was accepted -- led by the EU, the new controls used as a 
base 2.8 per cent of 1989 CFC consumption plus 1989 HCFC consumption. 
Critics continued to highlight the fact that controls were placed only upon 
consumption, not production as well. As a consequence, the potential for export 
production in the EU remained high. Indeed, given that the controls on HCFCs 
consumption in developing countries were rather far in the future — a 
stabilisation date of 2016 (based on 2015 levels), with a final phaseout by 2040, 
was agreed in Vienna — the scope for massive increases in HCFC production 
remained.28 This no doubt pleased those with large HCFC production capacity.
Indeed, the development of the European position can, in part, be 
explained by concerns about industrial interests. With the French so heavily 
committed to HCFCs as alternatives to CFCs, it is understandable that they 
would want the Union to go slower on proposals for controls. This is given 
greater tangibility when one recognises that a 0.1 per cent difference in the cap 
calculated (that is, for example, the difference between a cap at 2.5 per cent and 
one at 2.6 per cent) would mean a difference in allowable EC consumption of 
approximately 3,500 tonnes a year,29 which could translate into sales revenues
28 Indeed, these controls may serve to encourage short-term consumption of these chemicals 
in the developing world (in order to increase a country's base-line figure). See, generally, 
Krueger and Rowlands (1996).
29 This calculation is based on the fact that 1989 consumption of CFCs in the EU-15 was 
reported as 236,643.34 tonnes (UNEP 1993). While 0.1 per cent of this is 237 tonnes, the fact 
that HCFCs have lower ODPs than CFCs would allow approximately 11-18 times as much to 




























































































of US$10 million a year.30 Though this annual figure is by no means 
astronomical, it could easily grow into significance over a period of years. 
Accordingly, the interests of the French in securing as long a payback period as 
possible are not surprising.
Ongoing Concerns
Controlling Methyl Bromide
Just as HCFCs began to attract considerable attention at the 1990 Meeting of 
the Parties, methyl bromide garnered many of the headlines at the 1992 
Meeting. In the EU, this ozone-depleting substance is mainly used as a soil 
disinfectant in agriculture, as well as a disinfectant for agricultural products. 
The only methyl bromide producer in the Union is Atochem (ENDS 1993c:37), 
with Greenpeace estimating that it made 50,000 tonnes of the chemical between 
1986 and 1995 (just over 7 per cent of the global total). Use of the compound in 
Europe, meanwhile, has been estimated at 19,000 tonnes per year (about one- 
quarter of the global total) (van Haasteren 1994:16).
In preparation for the 1992 Copenhagen Meeting of the Parties, European 
Environment Ministers met on 20 October of that year. At that meeting, the 
Dutch representatives pushed for tight European regulation, and a strong 
negotiating position at the upcoming Conference of the Parties. Their 
experience with the chemical had been far from positive: because it had 
polluted soil and groundwater in horticultural areas, the Dutch government had 
already agreed to ban it at home. As a first step towards a similar Europe-wide 
policy, they urged a 70 per cent reduction by 1995 (ENDS 1992b:37).
Others, though less adamant, still called for regulation. The United 
Kingdom, for example, supported a 25 per cent cut in methyl bromide 
production by the year 2000. However, a number of Southern states (namely, 
Greece, Spain and Italy — three major users of the chemical — and France — the 
major producer) fought these moves (ENDS 1992b:37). The interests of these 
countries, particularly the consumers, lay in the fact that methyl bromide was 
such an effective fumigant (it is easy to apply and it causes yields to increase 
dramatically) and that the agricultural crops most dependent upon it 
(strawberries and tomatoes) were important to their economies. They were
30 This figure is estimated by recognising that HCFC-22 and HCFC-141b/142b (the HCFCs 





























































































particular concerned about how competitors across the Mediterranean might be 
able to gain an advantage, were the use of methyl bromide to be restricted in 
their home countries. After debate and discussion, the EC Ministers agreed that 
the “Community would ask the Copenhagen meeting to include methyl bromide 
for the first time on the list of controlled substances, seeking to stabilise output 
at 1991 levels by 1995” (Reuters 1992).
Amid much debate over methyl bromide in Copenhagen, the more 
sceptical among the European countries highlighted uncertainties in the special 
assessment reports to support their position. They were supported in this 
position by many developing countries, who feared not only increasing prices 
due to restricted supplies, but also the prospect of trade restrictions upon their 
agricultural exports (which are in effect “made with” the chemical) (Rowlands 
1993:27-28).
On the other hand, the United States was among the most pro-active, 
originally calling for the elimination of non-essential uses of methyl bromide by 
the year 2000 (UNEP 1992:18). United States interest in the issue was focused 
by the fact that, because it was anticipated that the ozone-depleting potential 
(ODP) of methyl bromide would be set at 0.7, the United States would 
automatically be required to take action, regardless of the outcome of the 
Copenhagen Meeting. Under the terms of Title VI of the US Clear Air Act 
(1990 Amendments), the production and importation of any substance with an 
ODP above 0.2 must be phased out within seven years. Given the importance of 
agriculture to states like California and Florida — and the potential of Mexican 
farmers to gain a competitive advantage (for they could continue to use this 
effective fumigant) — the US delegation pushed hard for global controls. They, 
however, were only partially successful: it was finally accepted that 
industrialised countries would freeze their consumption at 1991 levels by 1995 
(ENDS 1992c: 34).
After Copenhagen, the Commission emerged with a proposal on the way 
in which the Conference's commitments could be implemented by the 
Community. Going beyond simply what was agreed in Copenhagen, reports 
circulated that the Commission might propose a 20-30 per cent cut by the 
middle of the decade, with further reductions towards the decade's end (ENDS 
1993d:38). Were there ever such a proposal, it fell victim to the same forces that 
brought down the HCFC proposals (see above), and thus what emerged in June 
1993 was tamer.31 Nevertheless, it still went further than the international
31 DGVI — the directorate general for agriculture -  was reported to be particularly keen to 




























































































agreement, for the Commission proposed a 25 per cent reduction of 1991 
methyl bromide production levels by 1996 (though no further cuts were 
mentioned).
At a meeting of the Environment Council in June 1993, France and 
Greece immediately registered their opposition to the Commission's 
recommendations; Italy reserved its previous position in opposition, and some 
observers suggested that Spain was wavering (ENDS 1993a:38). However, at a 
Council meeting on 5 October of the same year, some movement was evident. 
More specifically, France and Spain suggested that a 25 per cent reduction was 
allowable, with it taking effect in 2000 (ENDS 1993b:35).
When the Regulation was finally agreed by Ministers at the end of 1993, 
consumption levels had been frozen at 1991 levels from 1995 (mirroring the 
international position), while a 25 per cent reduction by 1998 was to follow 
(thus going beyond the international position). This was a compromise proposal 
that had been put forward by the Belgian Presidency, meant to fall between 
those who wanted more (including Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, 
many of whom were taking unilateral action on the chemical) and those who 
wanted somewhat less (particularly France, Greece, Spain and Portugal) (ENDS 
1993c:37).32
During preparations for the 1995 Vienna Conference, however, methyl 
bromide again attracted much debate. When discussions in the Council began, it 
became clear that the dividing lines had shifted slightly, though perhaps 
significantly. While, Greece and Portugal continued to oppose any further 
controls, two traditional opponents of regulation — Spain and France — 
indicated their willingness to support a 50 per cent cut by the year 2005.32 3 By 
doing so, they joined Italy in a common position (ENDS 1995a:42, 1995b:37). 
On the other hand, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Austria pushed for 
a complete phaseout by 2001 (EE 1995:11). The United Kingdom and Belgium
32 “The argument for doing so is based above all on the risk of competition distortion with 
non-member Mediterranean countries” AE (1993b). The proposed regulation was sent to the 
Parliament early in 1994. As with the HCFC proposal, the Parliamentarians went further — in 
this case, they proposed a complete prohibition of the chemical by the end of 1999 (ENDS 
1994:36). Ministers, however, rejected this amendment in June, and the original proposal 
eventually came into effect.
33 Nevertheless, many still highlighted the potential economic impact of methyl bromide 
regulation. One report, for example, claimed that “to ban the use of methyl bromide in Europe 
could lead to agricultural losses in France, Spain, Italy and Greece equivalent to PTS 300 




























































































took an intermediate position: supporting a 50 per cent reduction by 2000 
(ENDS 199a:42, 1995b:37).
In the end, the Chair's position -- that is, Spain — prevailed, and with this 
stance, the EU entered the Vienna negotiations. At the Conference of the Parties 
itself, methyl bromide proved to be the key issue upon which the Union was 
“behind” most other major industrialised countries. (See the discussion in the 
previous section about how this issue is linked to the HCFC debate.) Continuing 
to be spurred by the economic interests generated by its own domestic 
legislation, the United States pushed for an advanced phaseout date (though 
with significant exemptions).34 The EU, however, tried to resist this movement: 
though Germany and the UK reportedly supported a 2001 phase-out, southern 
states (particularly Spain) desired less (EPL 1996:67). In the end, the Parties 
agreed to a complete phaseout of methyl bromide by 2010. Reflecting its 
concerns for a level playing-field, “Spain, acting as EU President, insisted that 
the process should include trade measures against non-parties to the Protocol. 
Its main concern is that it will suffer from unfair competition from Morocco 
which is not a party and will be able to use methyl bromide freely” (ENDS 
1995c:36).35 Again, we see concerns about competitiveness entering 
discussions about the EU's external environmental regulatory reform policy on 
ozone-depleting substances.
Other Issues
The focus upon CFCs, HCFCs and methyl bromide should not distract from the 
fact that there are other ozone-depleting substances. Controls on halons were 
present in the original Montreal Protocol, while regulations on carbon 
tetrachloride and methyl chloroform were introduced in 1990; the elimination of 
hydrobromofluorocarbons, HBFCs, moreover, was agreed in 1992. It is 
certainly the case that concerns about industrial interests, and competitiveness 
more generally, have affected the discussions about controlling the production 
and consumption of these chemicals. The United Kingdom, for example, pushed 
for a slower phaseout of methyl chloroform during a debate among European 
ministers about it in early 1992. It was reported that the UK position was “on 
the grounds that it is used by many small businesses which face difficulties in *3
34 The US Environmental Protection Agency pushed for a global phaseout by 2001 for its 
officials thought that “a level playing field would be most fair to those in the agricultural 
community, and the best and fastest way to develop alternative pest control tools” (USEPA, 
Methyl Bromide Home Page, WorldWideWeb).
33 Another report also notes that some countries feared “the competitive advantage for Slates 




























































































finding substitutes” (ENDS 1992d:68). The fact that 1CI was producing it as a 
substitute for CFC-113 no doubt also entered the calculation.
There are other issues that have been, and will probably continue to be, 
important to this debate. The definition of “essential uses” is one such instance. 
Companies and governments, for example, may use this as a means to protect 
potentially-affected interests and entities. The concern about the production and 
consumption of ozone-depleting chemicals in the developing world is another. 
We have already seen this interest in the debate about HCFCs (with European 
producers wanting to ensure that markets for these chemicals will emerge in the 
South). Any movement to bring forward controls on HCFCs would inevitably 
generate even further debate.
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this contribution has been to explore regulatory reform in the 
sector of ozone depleting substances, highlighting how the conflicting goals of 
environmental protection and economic competitiveness influenced policy 
change. Concerns about economic competitiveness, and the interests of industry 
more generally, have affected the development of the European Union's policy 
on ozone layer depletion. From the views expressed by the British over CFC 
regulation, through the interest shown by the French in HCFC controls, to the 
position of the southern EU countries in the methyl bromide debate, it is clear 
that concerns about the way in which an EU policy may impact Member States' 
interests, economically-defined, has played a role in EU decision-making: states 
resisted reforms which could undermine their domestic economic positions, and 
advocated reforms which either expanded their export markets or preserved 
their competitiveness by spreading internationally the costs originally borne 
through unilateral action. Moreover, these concerns have expressed themselves 
both inside the Union — that is, in the Council of Ministers — and externally — 
that is, when the EU has participated in global negotiations. Consequently, 
those advancing the thesis that industrial interests and worries about economic 
competitiveness exercise an important influence on the formation of 
environmental policy in the EU have been given some support by this case- 
study.
At the same time, however, the evidence has also revealed there were a 
number of instances throughout the history of the issue when regulatory reform 
could not be explained by corresponding shifts in economic calculations -- for 
example, the relative greening of the United Kingdom in 1988/89, as well as the 




























































































present decade. Caution, therefore, should be exercised when striving to explain 
the development of EU environmental policy. Other factors — for example, non­
economic concerns on the part of Member States, the functioning of domestic 
institutions, the effects of advancing scientific knowledge or simple conference 
dynamics — must have played a part.36 Indeed, the paper has illuminated 
occasions when the Commission, acting as a semi-autonomous agent of 
environmental protection, successfully pushed regulatory reform faster or in a 
different manner than the states desired.
Therefore, a cautious-endorsement of the hypothesis — that is, that 
concerns about economic competitiveness, and the interests of industry more 
generally, have influenced the development of the European Union's policy on 
ozone layer depletion — is offered in this paper. It certainly helps to make sense 
of many of the intra-European and global debates and negotiations on the issue 
of ozone layer depletion, but it is not a panacea.
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